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ABSTRACT 
Classical social decision procedures are supposed to map 
lists of preference orderings into binary relations which describe 
society's "preferences." But when there are infinitely many 
alternatives the resulting plethora of possible preference orderings 
make it impossible to differentiate "nearby" preference relations. 
If the preference information used to make social decisons is imperfect, 
society may wish to implement a continuous social decision procedure 
(SDP) so that nearby preference configurations will map into nearby 
social preference relations. It is shown here that a continuity 
requirement can severely restrict the admissable behavior of a social 
decision procedure. Furthermore a characterization of continuous 
SDP's is presented which facilitates the examination of such procedures 
and their relation to various voting mechanisms. 
CONTINUOUS SOCIAL DECISION PROCEDURES* 
John A. Ferejohn and Edward W. Packel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Classical social decision procedures are supposed to map lists 
of preference orderings into binary relations which describe so�iety's 
"preferences." But when there are infinitely many alternatives the 
resulting plethora of possible preference orderings make it impossible 
to differentiate "nearby" preference relations. If, for whatever reason, 
the preference information used to make social decisions is imperfect, 
society may wish to implement a continuous social decision procedure 
(SDP) so that nearby preference configurations will map into nearby social 
preference relations. But, as will be shown, a continuity requirement can 
severely restrict the admissable behavior of a social decision procedure. 
A great many otherwise attractive decision procedures including 
virtually all of the rules which base social decision on the proportion 
of those individuals having a preference -- turn out not to satisfy 
this axiom for fairly natural topologies. In view of its strength, then, 
it seems sensible to ask in what sense a continuity property is a 
desirable characteristic of a social decison procedure. 
There seem to be two principal justifications for a 
continuity requirement. First, people may not be able, psychologically 
or physiologically, to tell the difference between a given preference 
and one that is very close to it. In the event that this failure of 
*This research was supported by grants SOC78-24787 and SOC79-07366 
from the National Science Foundation. 
discrimination is based on physiological limitations; one could claim 
that either of two nearby preferences ever has a claim to being 
considered the "true" preference. Thus, even if the social decision 
based on two nearby preferences were greatly different, it could be 
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argued that there is no reason to believe that one has any greater claim 
to validity than the other. The social decision process is basically 
indeterminate in this case (indeed, it might best be modelled as a 
correspondence rather than a function) and, at points of discontinuity, 
the degree of indeterminacy may be relatively great. 
On the other hand if the reason that an individual cannot 
tell the difference between two nearby preference relations is 
because the act of working out the necessary comparisons is costly, 
then there is a sense in which the individual 's true preference 
"really" is distinct from nearby ones. And if the social decision 
process was discontinuous at such a point, the social decision 
could be quite "incorrect" from that standpoint. In this case 
continuity of the SDP would allow society to get as near to the correct 
social binary relation as is desired by paying the cost of making 
discriminations among preferences at the individual level. 
The second argument in favor of the continuity of a social 
decision procedure is that if the transmission process by which individuals 
communicate their preference orderings is relatively coarse then two 
distinct preference configurations which might yield very different social 
decisions could produce the same messages from the individuals. This 
coarseness may be inherent in the nature of linguistic description itself 
but it seems likely that increasingly fine discriminations would be 
available at some cost. (For example, through the use of longer and 
more complete descriptions of preferences.) 
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If the processes of discrimination or transmission are costly, 
then, but these costs are not infinite, the continuous social decision 
procedures have a natural appeal. These processes are the ones that 
can be guaranteed to be as nearly "correct" as we like if the appropriate 
costs are incurred to improve the discrimination or transmission 
processes. If, on the other hand, either of these processes have limits 
beyond which they cannot be improved then continuity of the SDP will 
not guarantee its approximately accurate performance. Indeed, the 
very notion of "accurate" performance may make little sense if such 
natural limits exist. 
In this paper we shall present a characterization of the 
continuous SDP's that will reveal the crucial role played by the way 
in which an SDP treats individual indifference. Some impossibility 
theorems will then follow as corollaries to this result. We then show 
that if an SDP is continuous and satisfies binary independence and a 
weak monotonicity property, it must be a simple game at each point. 
Finally, we show that if an SDP is continuous-valued as well as 
continuous, then some of our theorems can be extended from pointwise 
to local results. 
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION 
Throughout the paper we let X stand for the set of 
alternatives and N for the set of individuals. Individual i 's 
preferences are described by a weak order over X and are denoted by 
Ri. As is usual, the asymmetric and symmetric parts of Ri are written 
as Pi and Ii. The collection of weak orders on X is written as R, 
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while B denotes the collection of complete, reflexive binary relations 
on X. 
Let I NI = n and let each i E N have preferences in n. c R. 
l. -
We assume throughout the paper that each ni is rich enough that for any 
x, y E X, there exists R., Ri', and R'.' E ni such that xP .y, xI 'y, and l. l. l. i 
yPfx. Letting Q = n1 x n2 x • . .  xnn, an SDP is a mapping F : Q + B. 
Given 'IT = (Rl'�, • • .  ,Rn) E n, we abbreviate F ('IT) by B. Given B E B and 
x, y E X, we use the shorthand xPy - xBy and -yBx. Likewise, 
xiy - xBy and yBx. An SDP is said to satisfy binary independence 
(BI) at (x,y) if \/'IT, 'IT' E Q, 
(xRiy - xR�y and yRix - yR�x \Ji E N) � (xBy - xB'y),, 
We assume that B is endowed with a topology ' · Then each ni 
will be given the relative topology and n the product topology, inherited 
from 'i" The following topological conditions on <B,c> will be impJrtant 
in what follows. 
Tl: 
T2: 
l;/x # y, V a neighborhood of B and xiy � 3B ' E V s.t. xP'y. I 
\Ix, y E X, xPy � 3 a neighborhood V of B s.t. xP'y \/B' E v.'I 
We note that for natural definitions of n both of these 
conditions are satisfied by preference topologies common to the eclnomic 
 I a comp'/-ct literature. Let the alternative space, X, be toplogized as 
metric space with each n. Range(F) consisting of relations on X whose 
l. I 
I graphs are closed in X x X. Then the Hausdorff metric toplogy sat�sfies 
I 
Tl and T2. More generally, if X is a locally compact, separable m�tric 
 
space and we restict to relations with closed graphs, the topology l of
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closed convergency (Hildenbrand [4] , Debreu [2]), also satisfies Tl 
and T2. Depite the availability of these "natural" topologies, we carry 
out our development with T unspecified to maximize generality and to lay 
bare the roles played by Tl and T2. 
III. MAIN RESULTS 
Given a topology T on B, we now state the continuity condition 
that is central to our results. For x, y € X, 
F : r2 + B is continuous at (x,y) if V TI € r2 with B = F(TI) 
satisfying xPy, 3 a neighborhood U of TI s. t. xP 'y VTI ' € U. 
Thus, continuity at (x,y) says that profiles yielding a social preference 
for x over y must have neighborhoods which preserve this social 
preference. As a consequence, sufficiently small errors in determining 
or reporting individual preferences will not alter a social preference 
for x over y. 
Lemma 1. Given F : r2 + B, if T2 holds then F continuous ="> F is 
continuous at (x,y) Vx, y € X. 
Proof. Given x, y € X and B = F(TI) with xPy, T2 gives a neighborhood 
V of B with xP'y VB' € V. By continuity of F at TI, 3 a 
neighborhood U of TI such that F (U) .::_ V. It then follows that 
xP'y VTI ' € U, so F is continuous at (x,y). 
Lemma 1 shows that if the topology satisfies Tl, standard 
definition of continuity is stronger than continuity at (x,y). It should 
be noted that by using continuity at (x,y) rather than continuity, we can 
henceforward dispense with any further mention of the topological structure 
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of Range (F), so that Tl and T2 are to be seen as restrictions on the I 
topology for n. Our first two theorems will show that this weaker form of 
I 
continuity is essentially equivalent to the following social choice condition. 
F :rl+B satisfies invariance with respect to shrinking 
indifference (ISI) at (x,y) if VTI, TI '  € n, 
xPiy - xPi_y and yPix - yPi_x Vi € N and xPy implies xP 'y. 
Thus ISI has an aspect of monotonicity (preserving xPy when individuals 
shift from indifference to xPiy) and an aspect of antimonotonicity 
(preserving xPy when individuals shift from indifference to yPix).
Theorem 1. Given Tl and BI at (x,y), then F 
(x,y) - F is ISI at (x,y). 
n + B continuous at 
Proof. Suppose xP iy - xPj_y and yP ix ="' yP i_x '<ii € N and xPy. We will 
show that xP'y. By continuity at (x,y) 3 a neighborhood 
U of TI =  (11_,R2, • • •  ,Rn) such that xP"yVTI"E U. From the way the 
product topology is defined we can choose neighborhoods Ui of Ri 
(i = 1,2, • • .  ,n) such that ul x u2 X• • •X Un.=. u. Define a profile 
TI* (R1*,R2*, • . .  ,Rn*) by using Tl as follows: for i such that xPj_y 
but -xPiy' choose Ri* € Ui such that xPi*y. For i such that yPj_x 
-yPix' choose Ri* € Ui such. that yPi*x. For all other i, choose 
but 
Ri* = Ri. Now TI* € U - xP*y by the way U was defined. Finally, 
I 
binary independence then gives xP 'y since P' and P* agree on {x,y}. 
Theorem 1 has two interesting corollaries. To state the flirst, 
we define F : n + B to be Ct - relative majority rule (1/2 � Ct < 1) i!f 
xPy - j{ijxPiy}j > a  Cl{ijxPiy}j + j{ijyPix}j). 
These rules ignore individual indifference, taking into account only 
the percentage of concerned voters favoring x over y. The familiar 
simple majority rule occurs when a = 1/2. 
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Corollary 1. Given Tl, an a - relative majority rule F cannot be continuous 
at any (x,y) with x # y. If T2 also holds F cannot be continuous. 
Proof. First note that a - relative majority rules satisfy BI. Given x # y, 
choose TI E n such that xP1y and xiiy Vi > 1. We must then have xPy.
Now choose TI1 E n such that xPiy and yPix Vi > 1. Since j{ilxPiy}j/n � 1/2 
(we assume n > 1), we cannot have xP'y, so F does not satisfy ISI at 
(x,y). By Theorem 1, F cannot be continuous at (x,y). With T2 present, 
Lemma 1 shows that F cannot, therefore, be continuous. 
The second corollary is a continuity based impossibility 
theorem in the spirit of Arrow. A similar result was developed in 
McManus [5]. We say that F is strong Pareto (SP) at (x,y) if 
VTI E n, {jijxP.y} # �and {ijyP.x} = � =-> xPy. 
]. ]. 
Corollary 2. Given Tl and any x # y, there does not exist an F 
which satisfies BI, SP, and continuity at (x,y) and (y,x). 
Proof. Suppose F satisfied all the above conditions for some 
n + B 
(x,y) E X x X, x # y. Choose TI E n such xP1y and yiix Vi > 1. By SP 
we have xPy. Now choose TI' E n such that xPiy, yPzx, and xiiy Vi > 2. 
Since the hypotheses of Theorem 1 hold, F is ISI at (x,y), so we have 
xP' y. A repeat of this argument with the roles of x and y and 
individuals 1 and 2 reversed gives a TI" E n with xPJ_y, yP2x, and 
xI'J.Y Vi > 2 and yP"x. But BI at (x,y) requires yP'x, contradicting 
the asymmetry of P'. 
The following converse to Theorem 1 shows that ISI and 
continuity at (x,y) are essentially equivalent. 
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Theorem 2. Given T2, F n + B satisfies ISI at (x,y) � F is continuous 
at (x,y). 
Proof. Given TI E n with xPy, we seek a neighborhood U of TI such thlt  E A, T2 ensures 
 xP'y VTI' E u. Let A =  {ijxPiy} and B = {ijyPix}. 
For i 
E B, T2 ensures 
 a neighborhood Ui of Pi such that xPiy VPi E Ui. 
For i 
a neighborhood Ui of Pi such that yPix VPi E Ui. For i E N- (AUB) let 
Ui = ni. Then U = U1 X u2x•••XUn is a neighborhood of TI. Finally,
from ISI at (x,y) it follows that xP'y VTI' E U. 
In contrast to Corollary 1, the important class of majority 
rule procedures do satisfy continuity at each (x,y). Define 
F : n + B to be a - absolute majority rule (1/2 � a < 1) if 
xPy - j{ijxP.y}j > an. 
]. 
The ubiquitous absolute majority rule occurs when a = 1/2. 
Corollary 3. Given T2, the a - absolute majority rules are continubus 
at every (x,y). 
Proof. Just note that these rules satisfy ISI at every (x,y)i and 
apply Theorem 2. 
In fact, Theorem 2 implies continity for a much broader ciass 
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of voting rules, those that have a simple game structure at each (x,y) 
with x i y. A (proper, monotonic) simple game at (x,y) over a set N of 
players is defined by a collection S(x,y) subsets of N satisfying: 
Sl: N E S(x,y) 
S2: A E S(x,y) and A.::_ B � B E S(x,y) 
S3: A E S(x,y) � N - A i S(x,y). 
We say that F : n + B is simple at (x,y) if 3 a simple game S(x,y) such that 
xPy - {iixPiy} E S(x,y).
F is simple if it is simple at (x,y) for all (x,y) and S(x,y) = S. 
Define F : n + B to be semimonotonic at (x,y) if \in, n' En, 
{ilxPiy} = {ilxP�y}, {ilxiiy} .::_ {ilxiiy}, and xPy � xP'y. 
Finally, call F : n + B nontrivial if xPy for some x, y E X and TI E n. 
Theorems 1 and 2 provide the following characterization. 
Theorem 3. Given Tl and T2 and xi y, then a nontrivial F : n + B is 
BI, continuous and semimonotonic at (x,y) - F is simple at (x,y). 
Proof. The result follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2 as soon as it 
is observed that F is ISI and semimonotonic at (x,y) - F is simple 
at (x,y). 
Thus continuity at (x,y), a seemingly reasonable requirement 
in some situations, is closely_ connected with the common notion of 
a simple game at (x,y). The fact remains, however, that the simple 
game may change at each pair (x,y), leaving considerable room for 
variety and complexity. 
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By combining our results with those presented in Ferejohn, 
I Grether, Matthews, and Packel [3], some local results can be achie�ed. 
Given F : n + B, define F to be continuous�valued at (x,y) if 
\fn E n, xPy � 3 a neighborhood, W, of (x,y) such that uPv \f (u,v) e W. 
This definition requires a topology on X which we assume to be 
Hausdorff and to have the property that all nonempty open sets condain 
infinitely many elements. We shall need two additional assumptionj 
on the preference domains ni, i = 1,2, • • .  ,n. 
Dl: Given x j y, 3 neighborhood Y of (x,y) and R, R', R" E ni sucn 
that uPv, uI'v, and vP"u \f(u,v) E Y. 
D2: Given x # y and a sequence (xn,yn) + (x,y) with (xn,yn) # (x,�) \in, 
3 R E ni such that xiy and xnPyn \in. 
Finally, we define F : n + B to be locally ISI at (x,y) 
if \in, n' E n , 3 neighborhood W of (x,y) such that \f(u,v) E W, 
xPiy � uPi_v and yPix � uPi_v \ii EN and xPy implies uP'v. 
Theorem 4. Given Tl, Dl, D2 and BI at (x,y), then F : n + B continuous 
and continuous-valued at (x,y)· �F is locally ISI at (x,y). 
Proof. Throughout this proof, given TI E n let Ax y = {ilxP.y} and ' l. 
B = {ilyP.x} with analogous notation for n' En and u, v E X. x,y i 
n Suppose F were not locally ISI at (x,y). Then 3 n, {n } En and 
{xii}, {yh} E X  with (l\i,yh) + (x,y) such that xPy, A�,yh 2 B�'yhl 2 Bx,y 
and yhRh� \fh = 1,2, .... Since N is a finite set, we can assume �th 
no loss of generality that A� •-Ji = A' and B� •yh = B' \th. We als.o set 
A =A and B = B. Using Dl and D2 (and replacing (� ,yh)-by a x,y x,y n 
subsequence if necessary) 3n* £ n such that 
i) xP!y and ,,_ P!yh 'r/i £ A, \lh 
ii) yP!x and � P!,,_ 'r/i £ B, \lh 
iii) xl!Y and � P!Yh 'r/i £ A' - A, \lh. 
iv) xl!Y and yh P!� 'r/i £ BI - B' 'rlh 
v) xI!Y I� I!Yh 'r/i £ N - (A' U B'), \lh. 
Since F satisfies BI everywhere, 
yh R
h 1i_ � yh R*2\i (If and R* agree on {2\i ,yh }).
From continuous-valued at (x,y) we then get yR*x. Again applying 
BI (this time at (x,y)), it follows that yRx since R* and R agree 
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on {x,y}. This contradicts xPy, establishes the desired contradiction, 
and completes the proof. 
The approach used here is similar in spirit to that of [3]. 
It is interesting to note that continuity gives ISI at (x,y), while 
the continuous-valued assumption extends the ISI property on a deleted 
neighborhood of (x,y). Thus the two continuity properties complement 
each other nicely. As with our earlier continuity results, we also 
get a converse theorem. 
Theorem 5. Given T2 and continuity of individual preferences in 
n. 'r/i £ N, then F : n + B locally ISI at (x,y) � F is continuous and 
l. 
continuous-valued at (x,y). 
Proof. Let W be a neighborhood of (x,y) making F locally !SI 
at (x,y). Given n £ n such that xPy, define A= {ilxPiy} and 
B = {ilyP.x}. Note that each set P. c Xx Xis open and each 
l. i -
Ri � X x X is closed since individual preferences are assumed to be
continuous. Define 
y = w n c n Pi) n c n ex x x - Ri)).i£A i£B 
Then Y is a neighborhood of (x,y) and, by the local !SI assumption 
at (x,y), (u,v) £ Y � uPv. Thus F is continuous-valued at (x,y). 
Continuity at (x,y) is taken care of by Theorem 2. 
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It might be hoped that the combination of F being continuors 
and continuous-valued at every (x,y) would be enough to imply, und 
appropriate connectivity assumptions, that F could be completely 
represented by a single simple game. This does not appear to be t:r;ue. 
A global simplicity result requiring an additional assumption is 
obtained in [3].
IV. DISCUSSION
The results given here suggest that continuous SDP 's exislt 
which also satisfy a variety of attractive properties such as 
monotonicity, anonymity, neutrality, and the weak pareto principle. 
Indeed, absolute majority rule satisfies each of these conditions and 
is continuous in a natural sense. Thus, while a number of familiar 
aggregation procedures such as any of the a-plurality rules, are nor 
continuous in this sense, the imposition of a continuity requirement 
by itself does not have the effect of precluding "democratic" 
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decision procedures. 
These results might seem to be at variance with the work of 
Chichilnisky, who has argued that a continuous social aggregation rule 
(SAR) cannot satisfy anonymity and the weak pareto principle [l]. 
As might be expected, her framework is somewhat different from ours 
in that preference orderings are represented by functions indicating 
the most preferred direction at each point in the alternative space. 
A SAR then associates each n-tuple of preferences with another 
preference (which may be the zero vector). Her requirement that social 
preference be representable by indicating a most preferred direction 
in effect excludes most voting procedures from the start. Such 
procedures will not generally exhibit a unique socially most preferred 
direction. 
We should also emphasize that, in our framework, there is no 
contradiction between the continuity property and Arrow's independence 
of irrelevant alternatives. As corollary 2 makes clear, the continuity 
of an SDP is incompatible with the strong pareto condition in the 
presence of binary independence; but this is because the strong pareto 
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